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A CONSTRUCTIVE CRITIQUE OF THE FOUNDATIONS OF PHILOSOPHY
Ramesh Nath Patel, Ph.D.
Department of Philosophy
University of New Mexico, 1970
Philosophy pursues a rational explication of our under
standing, experiences, and values in terms of objective truth
and reality.

Conspicuously, its view of rationality has been

rigid and preconceived.

Application of this preconceived

reason in the explication of the essential features of our
world fails and issues in a network of dialectical tangles.
These artificially created tangles pose a unique intellectual
challenge, but the perennial failure to resolve them limits
the intellectual response of philosophers to remaining caught
in the tangles, or to taking intuitively favorable sides, or
to simply denouncing the tangles as meaningless.

Each is

understandable.
Superficially, traditional philosophical reason looks
like a correct tool for the explication of our world of com
mon sense, but its applications to the world result in logi
cal tangles showing its inadequacy.

The philosopher's faith

in such reason ends up in one of two positions:

abandoning

our world in the interests of such reason, or embodying it
self in the world through a special form of reason.

Classi

cally, Plato took the first and Aristotle the second position.
My analysis shows that Plato failed to explicate the relation
between his world of Forms and our world of particulars, and,
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more importantly, between the Forms and the intuitive reason
which grasps them.

Aristotle, in my analysis, cannot conceal

that the law of noncontradiction is a mere exhortation and
has no descriptive necessity with respect to thought, things,
or meaning.

We also find such dialectical difficulties in

Augustine, Hume, and Strawson.
"Microphilosophical feasibilism" is our proposal for
the best treatment, if not the definitive solution, of these
problems.

Instead of separating philosophical method into

logic, epistemology, ax iology, and metaphysics on the one
side, and partitioning the projected results of philosophi
zing into validity, truth, valuation, and reality on the
other, we need to start philosophizing with a general dis
tinction between "method employed" and "intended result."
This distinction is not pre-colored by claims to ultimate
verities.

It is a direct aid to understanding.

I consider

the basic inevitable paradox that a philosopher should ex
plain not only our understanding of experience but also his
philosophizing itself.

The circularity between "method em

ployed" and "intended result" needs to be admitted as an
initial fact about reason rather than circumvented by an
implausibly claimed capacity of philosophical reason to
formally transcend everything including this circularity.
Presuppositions are reduced to a minimum inevitable
number.

Being our primary microphilosophical criteria, they

are reason, experience, and value in their minimal sense.
They cannot be plausibly substituted or further reduced.
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They cannot be preferred one or more to others arbitrarily.
We show how, in rnicrophilosophy, they coincide or synchro
Jointly and basically, they form the minimal method

nize.

employed.

The initial, basic, intended result is called

minimum feasibility.

The fundamental circularity between

method and result leaves no way out but to ground self
reference in such a manner that method and result "logico
genetically" coincide.

Two extreme situations are avoided:

"the logical zero-situation" where nothing is true or real,
and "the credulous open situation" where everything is true
or real.

Finding a mean manifests a basic value.

If the

meaning of truth and reality is to be preserved, the basic
value must have a clear impact and express descriptive
rather than revisionary reason.
Several other stringent demands are raised as condi
tions which microphilosophy should fulfil to achieve feasi
bility.

The final, joint, outcome of both "method" and

"result," in the thesis of microphilosophical feasibilism,
is formulated thus:

Self refers freely and symbolically to

itself, own person, own body, material bodies, other persons'
bodies, other persons, and other selves.

